In examining neural processing speciWc to the self, primarily by contrasting self-related stimuli with nonself-related stimuli (i.e., self vs. other), neuroimaging studies have activated a consistent set of regions, including medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), precuneus, and right and left inferior parietal cortex. However, criticism has arisen that this network may not be speciWc to self-related processing, but instead reXects a more general aspect of cortical processing. For example, it is almost identical to the active network of the resting state, the "default" mode, when the subject is free to think about anything at all. We tested the self-speciWcity of this network by using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to brieXy disrupt local cortical processing while subjects rated adjectives as like or unlike themselves or their best friend. Healthy volunteers show a self-reference eVect (SRE) in this task, in which performance with self-related items is superior to that with other-related items. As individual adjectives appeared on a monitor, single-pulse TMS was applied at Wve diVerent times relative to stimulus onset (SOA: stimulus onset asynchrony) ranging from 0 to 480 ms. In 18 subjects, TMS to left parietal cortex suppressed the SRE from 160 to 480 ms. SRE suppression occurred at later SOA with TMS to the right parietal cortex. In contrast, no eVects were seen with TMS to MPFC. Together with our previous work, these results provide evidence for a self-speciWc processing system in which midline and lateral inferior parietal cortices, as elements of the default network, play a role in ongoing self-awareness.
Introduction
The concept of the "default" network was developed over the last decade after it was recognized, initially by Raichle (1998) , that there was a common pattern to the deactivations occurring in imaging contrasts during PET or fMRI over a wide spectrum of tasks when images obtained during the task conditions were contrasted with resting or control conditions (Binder et al. 1999; Fransson 2006; Gould et al. 2006; Greicius et al. 2003; Mason et al. 2007; Mazoyor et al. 2001; McKiernan et al. 2003) . This pattern has almost invariably included medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), precuneus/posterior cingulate, and left and right lateral parietal cortex. It was suggested that these areas were a default network that the brain returned to when not engaged in speciWc responses to the outside world. While the functions of this network are not known, a number of hypotheses have emerged, from ongoing neural maintenance to keep the brain in a responsive state ) to a system for reviewing past knowledge, planning future behavior and supporting self-consciousness (Cavanna and Trimble 2006) .
Over the same period, a number of neuroimaging studies have attempted to identify regions in the brain speciWc to processing the self, primarily by contrasting self-related stimuli with non-self-related stimuli (i.e., self vs. other). For example, studies have been conducted in which a subject's own face is distinguished from other faces (Kircher et al. 2000 (Kircher et al. , 2001 Platek et al. 2004) , or his or her own name from other names (Perrin et al. 2005; Sugiura et al. 2006) . Subjects have also been asked to recall personal vs. impersonal information (Maguire and Mummery 1999; Vinogradov et al. 2006; Nunez et al. 2005) or to assess their own vs. another's personality traits, appearance, attitudes, or feelings (Craik et al. 1999; Kircher et al. 2000 Kircher et al. , 2001 Kelley et al. 2002; Johnson et al. 2002; Kjaer et al. 2002; Fossati et al. 1995; Schmitz et al. 2004; Ochsner et al. 2005) , including our own work using PET in a task deciding whether visually presented adjectives described Self and Best Friend (Lou et al. 2004) . A very consistent set of cortical regions-including MPFC, precuneus/posterior cingulate, and left and right lateral parietal cortex-has been activated in these studies, across this wide variety of self-related tasks, that looks remarkably identical to the default network.
The striking similarity of the network derived from self/ other contrasts and the default network has led to speculation concerning the role of self-related processing in the default network (e.g., Lou et al. 2004 ), but interpretations have varied. Two recent reviews have in fact come to opposite conclusions. Schilbach et al. (2008) built upon ideas that the default network may be a neural correlate for a "sense of self" (Gusnard 2005; Wicker et al. 2003) . They argued that this network may indeed support the integration of self-referential information. Schilbach et al. made the case that self-consciousness has a social dimension and that self-processing occurs within a context of social cognition. Social cognition according to these authors is the set of related processes by which self/other distinctions are made and which mediate engagement of self/other interactions. They suggested that this processing of self-relevant information is performed in the default network and that, when in an unconstrained (resting) state, humans are predisposed to entertain social thoughts about oneself or other people. On the other hand, another recent review of many of the same imaging studies came to the conclusion that the network found in self/other contrasts is not related to self-speciWc processing (Ruby and Legrand 2008) . They noted that the regions comprising the "self" network are quite similar both to those activated in the "other" conditions of self/ other tasks, as seen in contrasts with other control conditions (e.g., Calder and Wicker 2002) as well as to those in the default network. Given that the same network appears to be activated for representation of self-referential content, for representation of another's mind, and for "operational" processing going on in the solitary and undisturbed brain at rest, Ruby and Legrand concluded that it is not activated by self-speciWc content. They oVered an alternative explanation of a non-speciWc cerebral network involved in a reasoning process of hypothesis generation and selection using information available to the subject in the surrounding context and also recalled from memory. In this context, the greater brain activation in self-speciWc conditions of self/ other tasks occurs because of their greater salience to the subject and the greater depth of processing or number of pathways to memory that stimuli related to the subject's own person aVord.
That opposing conjectures can arise in the interpretation of the same imaging results reXects the fact that brain imaging techniques are correlative and can only suggest brain/ behavior relationships but cannot prove causal relationships. On the other hand, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), a non-invasive means of temporarily modulating neural function, oVers a way of testing whether direct causal relationships link brain with behavior (for a review, see Luber et al. 2007a) . In the present case, modulation of performance in a self/other task caused by TMS applied to a node of the default network could demonstrate its involvement with self-speciWc processing. In a previous study, we were able to provide such a demonstration (Lou et al. 2004 ). Subjects rated adjectives as like or unlike themselves or their best friend. They consistently performed faster and more accurately when responding to adjectives in relation to themselves than to their best friend. It is typical to Wnd such a self-reference eVect (SRE) when processing stimuli related to the self compared to another (see Gillihan and Farah 2005 for a review). SREs may indicate a functionally distinct cognitive system for self-knowledge, much like the distinct systems proposed for language and face perception (e.g., Rogers et al. 1977) . Guided by PET activation results, we tested the involvement of midline cortical regions in the default network by using TMS to brieXy disrupt local cortical self-processing while subjects performed our task. Single-pulse TMS was applied to midline prefrontal cortex, precuneus, and midline occipital cortex at various times ranging from 0 to 480 ms after the onset of the visually presented adjective. We found a latency-and site-speciWc eVect: while judgments about best friends were not aVected by TMS, TMS did disrupt performance for self-judgments with stimulation of precuneus at 160 ms after stimulus onset, but not with stimulation of prefrontal or occipital cortex at any latency. Since the TMS pulses did not aVect responses involving the best friend as well as one's self, it is unlikely they were disrupting a general memory retrieval system. Therefore, these results provide evidence that at least one cortical region included in the default network might process information in a selfspeciWc way.
Left and right lateral parietal regions are also activated in most self/other tasks and are prominent elements of the default network. TMS to right parietal cortex has disrupted discrimination of one's own face from another's (Uddin et al. 2006) . While in our previous study, we concentrated on midline sites of the network; in this study, we applied single-pulse TMS to the left and right inferior parietal regions (as well as MPFC) while subjects performed the adjective task. At each site, we tested for TMS eVects on self-speciWc processing by looking for a nulliWcation of the SRE at each of the applied latencies. Best friend performance would be expected to be disrupted at the same times the SRE was if TMS was aVecting a general memory system, but should be unaVected if the network processed selfspeciWc information. Our study had two objectives. First, we wished to see whether additional areas of the self/other network besides the precuneus could be implicated in selfspeciWc processing. Second, we wished to see whether changes in the temporal pattern of TMS disruption at diVerent sites could provide information about the role various regions play in self-speciWc processing and as part of the default network.
Methods

Subjects
Eighteen healthy subjects (seven female) with a mean age of 27.8 § 8.8 (SD) years were recruited and provided written informed consent for the study, which was approved by the New York State Psychiatric Institute IRB. Subjects were required to have normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All subjects were screened with psychiatric, physical and neurological examinations, urine drug screens, and pregnancy tests for women of childbearing capacity. Potential subjects were excluded if they had a history of current or past Axis I psychiatric disorder (including substance abuse/dependence) as determined by the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-NP), a history of neurological disease, or seizure risk factors.
Adjective task
A set of 555 adjectives describing personality characteristics were obtained from Anderson (1968) . From this set, six 90-word lists were randomly chosen (without replacement) for each subject to be used in the experimental session. The last 15 words were used to practice the subject on the task. Subjects were seated in a cushioned chair in the middle of the testing room, facing a computer monitor 100 cm away, with his/her head resting in a chin rest. Each trial began with an adjective presented in the center of the computer monitor (Fig. 1) . The adjective remained on the screen for a maximum of 4 s and disappeared when the subject responded. As a list of adjectives was presented, subjects were asked to judge the applicability of each adjective to one's self or, in separate blocks, his/her best friend, on a six-point scale by pressing a number from 1 to 6 on a computer keyboard (1 = extremely uncharacteristic, 6 = extremely characteristic). Subjects were asked to proceed at their own pace. After approximately 5 min following the end of a 90-word list, each word was presented again, one at a time, with the requirement for the subject to indicate with a yes/ no button press whether or not the adjective had been judged to describe him/her self (or the best friend). During this second presentation of the list, subjects were asked to respond as quickly as possible. Reaction times and accuracy (match/mismatch in responses between the two list presentations) were recorded. A match occurred when the subject responded with a "yes" button press if he/she had chosen 4-6 in the Wrst list presentation, or responded with a "no" if 1-3 had previously been chosen.
TMS application
Single-pulse TMS was applied using a Wgure 8 coil (9 cm diameter) powered by a Magstim 200 stimulator (Magstim Co., Whitland, South West Wales, UK). TMS stimulus intensity was set at 150% of resting motor threshold of the left hemisphere (a group mean of 59.1 § 11.2% of maximum stimulator output), which was deWned as the lowest intensity needed to evoke motor potentials of at least 50 uV recorded via EMG from the Wrst dorsal interosseus muscle (FDI) in at least 5 out of 10 stimulations (Rossini et al. 2007 ). The motor threshold was performed with the Wgure 8 coil placed laterally to the vertex over a site producing the largest EMG response to TMS pulses, tangentially over the scalp, and with the handle of the coil facing toward the back of the head, rotated clockwise 45° in the tangential plane. Selection of the cortical areas targeted for stimulation was based on sites activated in self/other contrasts of PET images using the adjective task (Lou et al. 2004) . Three cortical sites were selected for stimulation: left and right lateral parietal cortex (angular gyrus) and midline prefrontal cortex. Order of stimulation in the session was counterbalanced between subjects. The sites were identiWed using high-resolution structural MRI scans obtained for each subject. The coil was positioned and accuracy of placement continuously monitored during task performance using Brainsight, a computerized frameless stereotaxic system (Rogue Research, Montreal, Canada). The system made it possible to track and correct online deviations from the target site to within several millimeters. We could not obtain structural images for Wve subjects; thus, the coil was positioned for these subjects using the International 10/20 system placements corresponding to the target cortical sites (Homan et al. 1987 ): P3 and P4 for the parietal sites, and 1 cm anterior to Fz for the prefrontal target. The focality of stimulation using a 150% intensity pulse from a Magstim 200 device (assuming a resting motor threshold of 40% stimulator output: Pitcher et al. 2003 ) was calculated using a Wnite-element analysis of a realistic head model (Deng et al. 2008 (Deng et al. , 2009 . Such pulses will produce an electric Weld strong enough to produce suprathreshold neuronal depolarization over a cortical region with a radius of about 1.8 cm. Based on the PET imaging of the adjective task from our previous study (Lou et al. 2004) , this is an appropriate focality for the midline targets used. However, while the estimated stimulated region remained within the lateral parietal cortex, it was somewhat larger than the regions activated in the PET study. For this reason, we have limited our discussion of results to lateral parietal cortex (rather than any of its subregions).
For each trial of a list's second presentation, a single pulse of TMS was delivered with a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the onset of an adjective and the TMS pulse of 0, 80, 160, 240, or 480 ms. Choice of SOA was randomized for each trial, with the constraint that eighteen trials of each SOA occurred during each 90 trial block and no more than four trials in a row had the same SOA. A TMS block was performed for Self and Best Friend conditions, counterbalanced across subjects, at each of the three stimulation sites. Each session lasted approximately 2.5 h.
Analysis
Median reaction time (RT) and mean accuracy (% correct) measures were determined for each subject. Although accuracy and RT may represent diVerent aspects of task processing, in the adjective task there is considerable confounding of the two measures in the form of speed/ accuracy trade-oVs. In our previous study (Lou et al. 2004) , we successfully developed an eYciency score to characterize overall performance and counteract speed/accuracy trade-oVs. The eYciency score is deWned as the velocity (i.e., 1/RT) corrected by a factor deWned by an accuracy term set to be 0 with chance performance and 1 with perfect performance: EYciency = [(% accuracy ¡ 50)/50]/(RT(in seconds)). All three measures (eYciency, accuracy, and RT) are reported and analyzed, but in keeping with our previous published work, the results are interpreted through the eYciency measure.
Eighteen subjects participated in the study, and all completed the blocks of TMS at the two parietal sites. Three subjects felt discomfort during prefrontal TMS and discontinued stimulation to that site. Omnibus repeated measures ANOVAs were run on the three performance measures for the 15 subjects who completed all three sites, with factors of Site (frontal, left and right parietal), Self/Best Friend, and SOA (0, 80, 160, 240, and 480 ms). These ANOVAs were repeated with the two parietal sites (removing the frontal site) for the 18 subjects that completed these sites.
A main eVect of Self/Best Friend was generally expected if TMS did not aVect processing, reXecting the SRE previously found with the adjective task. In our own pilot work, 18 of 23 subjects (none from the present study) doing the task without TMS performed with greater eYciency when making self-judgments than for best friend, with mean group eYciency scores of 1.01 ( §0.05) for self and 0.89 ( §0.04) for best friend (t 22 = 3.5, P < .001; Fig. 2) . A limitation of a no-stimulation condition is that it does not include the superWcial eVects of TMS (auditory click, scalp sensations, etc.), which can alter how a subject approaches a task. We therefore did not use a no-TMS condition in the design of our present study, relying on the observation that the SRE we found in subjects with no TMS was replicated in the presence of TMS in our previously published TMS study (Lou et al. 2004 ) at all SOAs with prefrontal stimulation, and at all SOAs but one (at 160 ms) with midline parietal TMS (see Fig. 4 of Lou et al. 2004) .
Given an overall SRE (reXected in a main eVect of Self/Best Friend in omnibus ANOVAs), TMS eVects are observable in eVects on SOA and on Site. With signiWcant outcomes involving SOA in the omnibus ANOVAs, sitespeciWc ANOVAs were run, with factors Self/Best Friend and SOA. When a signiWcant interaction of Self/Best Friend and SOA was found (indicating a possible self-speciWc TMS eVect), post hoc paired t-tests were performed, comparing the means of Self and Best Friend eYciency for all Wve SOAs. For these tests, the 0.05 alpha level was Bonferroni-corrected to 0.01. Here, in the most speciWc case, we looked for a temporally sensitive nulliWcation of the SRE (i.e., when self-performance is not signiWcantly greater than best friend in a one-tailed t-test) as the expected sign of the inXuence of TMS in disturbing self-related neural processing. In interpreting these results, we were able to rely on the data from our pilot work involving the task with no TMS, as well as from cases in our previous study (Lou et al. 2004 ) when the SRE remained undisturbed by TMS. For both these groups of subjects, when no eVect was caused by TMS, eYciency in the Self condition ranged from the low 0.9's to low 1.0's, while in the Best Friend condition, ranged from low to high 0.8's (e.g., Fig. 2) . Thus, for example, in cases where t-tests showed no diVerence in Self/Best Friend performance, if eYciency dropped in the Self condition from its normal range while Best Friend performance remained undisturbed, then a conclusion of self-speciWc processing, disrupted by TMS, could be suggested.
Results
Group mean eYciency, accuracy, and RT are shown in Table 1 and eYciency scores in Fig. 3 for Self and Best Friend conditions at the Wve SOAs for each of the three sites. Omnibus ANOVAs for the eYciency measure showed a main eVect of Self/Best Friend (F 1,14 = 13.4, P < .003), a Site £ Self/Best Friend interaction (F 2,13 = 5.2, P < .025), and an interaction of SOA and Self/Best Friend (F 4,11 = 4.1, P < .03). ANOVA for accuracy produced similar results, with a main eVect of Self/Best Friend (F 1,14 = 10.7, P < .006), a Site £ Self/Best Friend interaction (F 2,13 = 5.0, P < .025), and an interaction of SOA and Self/Best Friend (F 4,11 = 3.5, P < .05). ANOVA for RT showed a main eVect of SOA (F 4,11 = 11.3, P < .001).
ANOVAs for parietal sites alone for the eYciency measure also showed Site £ Self/Best Friend (F 1,17 = 14.8, P < .002) and SOA and Self/Best Friend (F 4,14 = 3.5, P < .035) interactions, as well as an interaction of Site and SOA (F 4,14 = 3.1, P < .05). For accuracy, there were also interactions of Site £ Self/Best Friend (F 1,17 = 11.2, P < .004) and Site and SOA (F 4,14 = 4.7, P < .02), as well as a main eVect of SOA (F 4,14 = 9.9, P < .0005). For RT, there was an interaction for SOA and Self/Best Friend (F 4,14 = 3.2, P < .05), and a trend for an interaction of Site and SOA (F 4,14 = 2.9, P < .06).
Given the interactions of SOA with Self/Best Friend in these tests (indicative of an eVect of TMS diVerential for self-processing), ANOVAs were run to examine the pattern of eVects at each site.
At the midline prefrontal site, an SRE was clearly apparent, with performance in the Self condition more (Table 1 ). The SRE can be observed in the diVerence of eYciency scores displayed in Fig. 4a and was reXected in the repeated measures ANOVA for eYciency, where a main eVect of Self/Best Friend (F 1,14 = 8.7, P < .01) was found with no main eVect of SOA or interaction. The ANOVA for accuracy had the same result, with just a main eVect of Self/Best Friend (F 1,14 = 8.9, P < .01). RT did show a main eVect of SOA (F 4,11 = 5.0, P < .02). At the right parietal site, the SRE was nulliWed at the highest latency SOA (480 ms), with an SRE occurring only at the earlier latencies (Fig. 4c) . The disappearance of the SRE appeared to be attributable to a drop in eYciency during the Self condition from the values seen at the other latencies (and to those seen in the task with no TMS), while Best Friend eYciency remained unchanged across SOAs (see Table 1 ). In the repeated measures ANOVA for eYciency, there was a main eVect of Self/Best Friend (F 1,17 = 12.64, P < .003) with no main eVect of SOA, and a signiWcant interaction of Self/Best Friend and SOA (F 4,14 = 3.55, P < .04). In post hoc analyses, performance in Self conditions was more eYcient than Best Friend at latencies of 0 ms (t 17 = 2.74, P < .007) and 80 ms (t 17 = 4.02, P < .0004), but not at 160, 240, or 480 ms. In the ANOVA for accuracy, there was a main eVect of Self/Best Friend (F 1,17 = 7.9, P < .02), while RT showed a main eVect for SOA (F 4,14 = 6.5, P < .004) and an interaction of Self/Best Friend and SOA (F 4,14 = 3.4, P < .04).
At the left parietal site, the SRE was nulliWed at all but the earliest SOAs. In addition, there was a reversal of the eVect at SOA of 160 ms (and to a lesser degree at 480 ms), with eYciency for Best Friend exceeding that of Self for the Wrst time (Fig. 4b) . The loss of the SRE was evident in the ANOVAs for eYciency, accuracy, and RT, as there were no main eVects or interactions at the left parietal site. However, there was a trend for the Self/Best Friend £ SOA interaction (F 4,14 = 2.1, P < .14) for eYciency. In post hoc analyses, Best Friend eYciency was greater than Self at 160 ms (t 17 = 2.22, P < .02). As can be seen in Table 1 , eYciency in the Self condition dropped to a value usually seen in the Best Friend condition, while Best Friend eYciency increased to a value usually only seen in the Self condition.
Discussion
In this study, self-speciWc eVects on performance in the adjective task were found using TMS at both lateral parietal sites. SpeciWcally, using disruption of the SRE (here, Selfperformance superiority in eYciency over Best Friend) in the task as the indicator of an eVect of TMS, the results at the prefrontal site replicated the Wnding of our previous study, where TMS had no eVect on performance at any SOA in 13 subjects (Lou et al. 2004 ). Similar to TMS to the precuneus in Lou et al. (2004) , stimulation over the right parietal site had a latency-dependent eVect beginning at the same time (160 ms), but continuing for a longer period. At the left parietal site, TMS nulliWed the SRE at all latencies tested and may have reversed the SRE at 160 ms, such that eYciency for Best Friend was better than for Self. As discussed below, these Wndings provide support for parietal membership in a self-speciWc processing system and that the function of the default network is related to self-speciWc processing (Lou et al. 2004 ); Schilbach et al. 2008) .
TMS eVects on the SRE provide evidence for a distinct self-speciWc system Initially, in non-physiological experiments contrasting selfrelated and non-self-related stimuli, SREs in performance were usually obtained and thought to be indicative of a functionally distinct cognitive system for self-knowledge, much like the distinct systems proposed for language and the perception of faces (e.g., Rogers et al. 1977) . However, a number of follow-up studies found that SREs could be diminished by certain factors (reviewed in Symons and Johnson 1997) . For example, the SRE could be substantially diminished if self-judgments were made relative to another well-diVerentiated individual, such as an immediate family member. Findings such as these led Symons and Johnson to conclude that SREs are not evidence for a specialized self-processing system. Instead, they proposed that they occur because "the self is a well-developed and oftenused construct that promotes elaboration and organization of encoded information." Gillihan and Farah (2005) , noting these studies, suggested that much of what has been reported as physiological evidence for self-speciWc systems in the brain might show diminished eVects if confounding factors were controlled, such as aVect and the degree a person has knowledge of another relative to one's self.
In the present study, attempts were made to control for elaborative and aVective diVerences between self and other conditions in three ways. First, the same set of stimulus words were used for both self and other conditions, and the stimulus lists were equated for positive and negative characteristics. Second, the "other" compared with self was someone who was strongly diVerentiated in the subject's memory: his or her best friend. Third, each list was presented a second time immediately after the Wrst. Thus primed, the beneWts of added pathways for self-information in memory searches was expected to be diminished. Our results appear to bear out the eYcacy of these manipulations and to provide evidence that the observed SRE indicates a functionally distinct system for processing self-speciWc information. If TMS were disrupting a memory system where the diVerences were just a matter of degree of diVerentiation, then with a drop in eYciency in the Self condition, a drop in best friend condition should also occur, although perhaps to a lesser degree. This was not observed in our results, although we did not directly test change against a baseline in this study. However, at all SOAs when TMS nulliWed the SRE (right parietal cortex at 480 ms, left parietal cortex at 240 ms, and, in our previous study, precuneus at 160 ms: Fig. 1) , stimulation caused the eYciency in the Self condition to drop to the level of the eYciency for Best Friend. In our pilot work with 23 subjects not receiving TMS, and our previous study (Lou et al. 2004) and in the prefrontal performance in the present study where there was no evidence of a TMS eVect (see Table 1 ; Fig. 2) , eYciency in the Self condition ranged from the low 0.9's to low 1.0's, while in the best friend condition, from low to high 0.8's. In the cases, where the SRE vanished, the Self-eYciency dropped into the performance range usually found with Best Friend, while the eYciency for Best Friend remained within its same range.
The eVect of TMS at left parietal cortex also argues against the memory elaboration explanation for the SRE. There, eYciency at 160 and 480 ms (Table 1 ; Fig. 2 ) in the Best Friend condition improved to levels seen in the Self condition when the task is performed without TMS, while eYciency in the Self condition with stimulation at those SOAs dropped to levels seen in the Best Friend condition. The facilitated performance in the Best Friend condition and disrupted performance in the Self condition at the same SOAs argue against a memory elaboration explanation, which would predict a drop in performance in either condition. Indeed, these eVects suggest the disruption of a selfspeciWc processing system. In this scenario, the disruption occurs when neural processing which normally interferes with task performance is disturbed by TMS, thus resulting in an improvement through subtraction of irrelevant processing. This sort of facilitation eVect has been reported with TMS to parietal cortex in visual attention (Walsh et al. 1999 ) and verbal working memory (Luber et al. 2007a, b) and in the Stroop task with TMS to prefrontal cortex (Hayward et al. 2004 ). For example, in the study by Walsh et al. (1999) TMS applied to a superior occipital location, which analyzes direction of motion resulted in an improvement in performance in a visual search task when stimuli were moving but direction of motion was irrelevant. In the present study, a left parietal self-speciWc system may become active when one is attempting to recall characteristics of a best friend. However, being self-speciWc, this activity may have more to do with aspects of the self/best friend relationship (e.g., how the best friend having a given trait has impacted the subject) and may in fact complicate a decision about a given trait a best friend may or may not possess. Disrupting this self-related processing with left parietal TMS may thus simplify the decision process about best friend traits occurring elsewhere, reducing less relevant input, thus allowing a faster route to action.
TMS eVects on SRE demonstrate a role for parietal cortex in episodic memory
In the present study, the sites at which TMS nulliWed the SRE were over left and right lateral parietal cortex, and our previous study showed this eVect at midline parietal cortex. These parietal locations might be surprising, as the adjective task used relies on retrieval of autobiographical episodic memories, and traditionally, parietal cortex is thought to be involved with sensorimotor integration and spatial attention. However, a recent fMRI study has demonstrated that the parietal cortex supports an episodic memory network that is anatomically and functionally distinct from a network involved in sensorimotor integration and spatial attention (Vincent et al. 2006) . Spontaneous activity in resting fMRI measurements in right and left lateral parietal areas and precuneus were correlated with activity in left and right hippocampal formation. These areas, which correspond to the same parietal regions found in the default network and stimulated in our studies with TMS, were also found to be active, along with hippocampus, in eventrelated fMRI measures of episodic memory. Moreover, Vincent et al. found that spontaneous activity in medial temporal areas known to be part of a temporo-parietal network involved with sensorimotor integration and spatial attention were correlated with activity in parietal regions spatially segregated from those parietal areas involved with hippocampus and episodic retrieval.
These Wndings support a rather extensive literature supporting the role of the parietal cortex in episodic retrieval. The precuneus, linked with cingulate and prefrontal regions, has long been implicated in episodic processes (for a review, see Cavanna and Trimble 2006) going back to some of the earliest work in PET, involving recognition of sentences heard 24 h previously (Tulving et al. 1994 ) and in paired associate learning of words (Shallice et al. 1994) . SpeciWcally, autobiographical material activates precuneus as well in episodic memory tasks (Gilboa et al. 2004) , as well as left and right lateral parietal cortex (Addis et al. 2004; Lundstrom et al. 2005; Nunez et al. 2005) . Our Wnding of a stronger SRE cancellation on the left was most likely related to the verbal nature of the task, as this region has recently been linked to major anatomical pathways involving language and implicated in semantic processing (Catani et al. 2005) .
TMS eVects suggest a role for parietal cortex and the default network in autonoetic consciousness
Although there is a great deal of evidence that parietal cortex is related to episodic, and especially autobiographical, memory, that relationship may be indirect. That is, default network regions in the parietal cortex may rely on material retrieved from episodic memory stores located elsewhere in order to review past knowledge, plan future behavior and support self-consciousness (Cavanna and Trimble 2006) or maintain information for interpreting, responding to and predicting external demands (Gusnard 2005) . Evidence for this hypothesis was reported in a recent study in which TMS to left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex disrupted performance in a non-verbal episodic memory task, but did not do so with stimulation to left and right lateral parietal cortices (Rossi et al. 2006 ). As discussed above, in the present study, cancellation of the SRE with TMS without aVecting performance in the Best Friend condition does not appear to be indicative of a direct eVect on a general memory retrieval system, where TMS should presumably disrupt retrieval of Best Friend information as well as Self. Instead, the eVects of TMS on performance in the adjective task suggest disruption of a system processing self-speciWc information.
There have been other suggestions for functions of parietal cortex that may call upon episodic memory, especially given its role as an element of the default network (for a review, see Cavanna and Trimble 2006) . For example, suggested that midline and lateral parietal cortex participate in conscious awareness, with the precuneus a tonically active region that continuously evaluates the external, and possibly internal, context. Schilbach et al. (2008) proposed that the context being evaluated includes the individual's social world. In a PET study examining episodic retrieval and the resting state, Andreasen et al. (1995) suggested activations of midline prefrontal and parietal regions might represent a network through which personal identity and past experiences are interlinked with each other, permitting human beings to experience personal identity, consciousness, and self-awareness. This self-awareness, termed "autonoetic consciousness," is thought to emerge by retrieval of episodic memory and has its basis in the capacity to place events in time and to reference them to oneself (Gardiner 2001 ).
The neurobiological basis for self-awareness has been inferred mainly by imaging studies. The medial prefrontal and parietal regions are anatomically connected directly via the cingulate gyrus, the cingulum tract, and the superior fronto-occipito fasciculus, and indirectly via the medial pulvinar nucleus of thalamus (van den Heuvel et al. 2009; Mufson and Mesulam 1984; Beer et al. 2002) , forming a loop of reciprocal cortico-cortical and cortico-thalamic connections (Tononi and Edelman 2000) . The loop is functional in the interaction between prefrontal/anterior cingulate and precuneus/posterior cingulate regions activated by retrieval of episodic memory (Lou et al. 2004 (Lou et al. , 2008 . Being recurrent and stabilized by feedback, it allows continuing re-activation, facilitating stimuli to cross duration and intensity thresholds for emergence of consciousness (Tononi and Edelman 2000; Libet et al. 1991) . Such organization is ideal for a sustained conscious state of selfawareness. Each of the structures in the loop is tightly connected with polymodal association regions such as the bilateral parietal cortices, and the left antero-lateral temporal region, and also with the cerebellum (Mesulam et al. 1977; Trojanowski and Jacobson 1974; Barbas and Mesulam 1981) . The need for this relatively newly developed polymodal association region (Chugani 1998; Clancy et al. 2001 ) is consistent with self-reXection as a phylogenetically (Baars 2005) and ontogenetically (Zelazo 2004 ) recently developed human capacity. This is in contrast to, for instance, the minimal conceptual self-awareness, which has been more associated with diVerential activation of the precuneus (Andreasen et al. 1995; Cavanna and Trimble 2006) . Polymodal sensory regions may act as "meeting places" for sensory information and retrieved memory information into a temporal and personal perspective. Single-cell studies and local cooling experiments in animals support such a role (Koch and Fuster 1989; Fuster 2000) . It may be speculated that the paralimbic loop oVers a venue for the distribution of such integrated information across the brain to compete for access to consciousness with selfreference to achieve a sense of unity. The paralimbic loop is therefore a good candidate for the neural substrate of the working space of consciousness as proposed by Baars (2002) and further developed by Dehaene et al. (2003) .
Single-pulse TMS demonstrated some of the dynamic processing in the adjective task necessary for consciousness. The left parietal region aVected from an early latency of 160 ms (probably due to the verbal nature of the task) and continuing through the latest time tested, while right parietal cortex only showed later processing, primarily at 480 ms is consistent with a recurrent re-activation of cortico-cortical and cortico-thalamic interaction in consciousness as suggested by Tononi and Edelman (2000) . The long duration of eVective neural activity inferred from our results suggests a suYcient time frame for consciousness to emerge, according to the experiments by Libet et al. (1991) , approximately 500 ms.
TMS to midline prefrontal cortex did not disrupt SREs
The lack of TMS eVects with stimulation to midline prefrontal cortex in this study was not unexpected, since this result replicated our earlier study (Lou et al. 2004 ). However, given the universal prominence of activity in this region in self/other contrasts in imaging experiments, the lack of eVects requires some consideration. One possibility may be related to the lower tolerability of prefrontal TMS compared to stimulation of the posterior scalp. In the present study, three subjects chose stop the frontal stimulation, but were able to tolerate parietal TMS. The distraction of unpleasant superWcial sensations can add to variability in the response (altering reaction time and/or accuracy) reducing eVect size. Another possibility is that a single TMS pulse may not be adequate to disrupt processing in the task in this area with the SOAs used. In future studies, other SOAs could be used, perhaps based on ERP studies. It should be noted that the full dynamic range of self-related processing based on ERP evidence was not completely investigated in the present study, which covered early-to mid-latency SOAs. ERP diVerences have been observed in contrasts of self and other faces (Keyes et al. 2010) , familiar and unfamiliar objects (Miyakoshi et al. 2007) , and in retrieval of memories concerning self and best friend (Magno and Allan 2007) . In all of these studies, ERP components sensitive to self/other conditions occurred within the latencies tested in our studies (i.e., between 0 and 480 ms), but later diVerences were also observed. For example, one study used a procedure with many similarities to the present study, with subjects shown words and asked to retrieve memories about themselves or a good friend related to the words (Magno and Allan 2007) . ERPs exhibiting self/friend diVerences were seen over both anterior and posterior scalp sites in a 100-400 ms window after the onset of the cue word, and also between 800 and 1,700 ms. This suggests that employment of SOAs later than those used in the present study might be eVective in producing frontal eVects. Repetitive TMS, in which a train of magnetic stimuli is used, might also serve as a more powerful disruptive technique. A third possibility is that the sort of processing related to the adjective task that might occur in midline PFC could be diVerent than in parietal cortex. For example, it could be that PFC self-speciWc processing might be more evaluative and aVect-laden, and not contribute to the SRE in the task, leaving the source of the SRE to other areas. Of interest in this regard, others have been able to produce a midline PFC TMS eVect using the adjective task (Kwan et al. 2007 ). The adjectives in the task included both desirable and undesirable traits (50% of each). They found subjects were biased toward agreeing with more desirable traits and not agreeing with less undesirable traits when describing themselves as opposed to their best friend. In Kwan et al., single-pulse TMS to medial prefrontal cortex at 500 ms SOA, but not to SMA or precuneus, diminished this bias, i.e. the aVective component of the task. This outcome suggests that the midline PFC portion of the default network does process self-speciWc information, albeit specialized for diVerent functions than parietal cortex.
Conclusion
The parietal eVects of the present study, combined with the eVects on precuneus in our previous study (Lou et al. 2004 ) and on medial prefrontal cortex in the study by Kwan et al. (2007) , demonstrate that four (out of four) brain regions common to networks observed in self/other tasks and the default network are sensitive to the processing of the self-speciWc content of the adjective task. These Wndings support the interpretations of Lou et al. (2004) and Schilbach et al. (2008) that the function of the default network is related to self-speciWc processing. They also demonstrate the value of TMS generally in testing the function of neural networks implicated by neuroimaging.
